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Implementing	the	integrated	approach:	
Investing	in	other	international	
organisations	
	
Hylke	Dijkstra	
Director	of	the	MA	in	European	Studies,	Maastricht	University,	The	
Netherlands	
	
Abstract	
	 	
This	contribution	points	at	the	importance	that	the	EU	ascribes	to	partnership	in	the	EU	
Global	 Strategy	 and	 other	 policy	 documents	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 implement	 the	 integrated	
approach	to	conflict	and	crises.	It	notes	that	the	EU,	as	part	of	the	implementation	of	the	
integrated	approach	concept	as	defined	in	the	EU	Global	Strategy,	has	actually	paid	very	
little	attention	to	other	 international	organisations,	and	has	 failed	to	properly	 invest	 in	
relevant	partners	such	as	 the	UN	and	the	OSCE.	The	contribution	makes	a	case	for	the	
EU	to	think	more	about	what	other	international	organisations	actually	need	in	terms	of	
resources	and	how	the	rules-based	global	order	more	generally	should	be	strengthened	
in	order	to	fully	implement	the	integrated	approach.	
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Partnership	with	other	international	organizations	(IOs)	has	long	been	a	key	objective	of	the	Europe-
an	Union	 (EU)	 in	 addressing	 international	 security	 challenges.	 This	 is	 also	evident	 in	 the	EU	Global	
Strategy,	which	states	that	“[t]he	EU	will	be	a	responsible	global	stakeholder,	but	responsibility	must	
be	shared	and	requires	investing	in	our	partnerships.	Co-responsibility	will	be	our	guiding	principle	in	
advancing	a	rules-based	global	order”.1	
Partnership	with	other	IOs	is	important:	While	the	EU	has	developed	as	a	serious	foreign	policy	actor,	
it	does	not	possess	the	full	spectrum	of	foreign	policy	instruments	(e.g.,	collective	defence	with	nu-
clear	deterrence).	Nor	is	the	EU-option	always	the	most	effective	or	legitimate	in	foreign	policy	mat-
ters	 (e.g.,	 in	 Eastern	Ukraine	or	 Sub-Saharan	Africa).	 In	 other	words,	 the	 EU	 cannot	 do	 everything	
alone.	The	concept	of	partnership	 therefore	deserves	a	central	place	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
integrated	approach	concept	as	defined	 in	 the	EU	Global	Strategy.	A	truly	 integrated	approach	not	
only	 requires	partnership	within	 the	 “multilateral	 approach”,	but	also	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	multi-
phased,	multi-level	and	multi-dimensional	approaches	identified	in	the	Strategy.2	
Partnership	with	other	IOs	is	nothing	new.	Indeed,	already	in	2013,	the	Joint	Communication	on	the	
EU's	Comprehensive	Approach	noted	 that	 “the	EU	needs	 to	engage	and	work	 together	with	other	
international	and	regional	actors.	The	role	of	the	EU	is	linked	–	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	–	to	the	
action	(or	non-action),	resources	and	expertise	of	others”.3	In	other	words,	it	is	thus	well	known	and	
well	accepted	that	partnership	with	other	IOs	is	required	to	achieve	a	truly	integrated	approach.	The	
EU	Global	Strategy	stresses	this	even	further.	
Implementing	partnerships	with	other	IOs	is,	however,	a	whole	different	matter.	When	thinking	con-
ceptually	about	partnerships	at	the	programmatic	level,	it	is	critical	for	the	EU	to	do	two	things.	First,	
it	has	to	define	its	own	profile.	What	are	the	foreign	policy	and	security	actions	that	the	EU	wants	to	
develop,	itself?	The	EU	Global	Strategy	–	although	not	entirely	written	in	operational	language	–	of-
fers	important	insights	in	this	respect.	It	puts	the	emphasis	on	the	security	of	EU	citizens	and	it	priori-
tizes	the	EU	neighbourhood.	It	talks	about	strategic	autonomy,	thereby	reaffirming	the	St	Malo	tradi-
tion	and	the	EU's	modest	role	in	crisis	management.4	
                                                
1	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS),	Shared	Vision,	Common	Action:	A	Stronger	Europe	–	A	Global	Strategy	for	the	
European	Union’s	Foreign	And	Security	Policy,	June	2016,	p.	18,	
2	Ibid.,	p.	29.	
3	European	Commission	and	High	Representative	of	the	Union	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy,	Joint	Communication	
to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council:	The	EU's	comprehensive	approach	to	external	conflict	and	crises,	11	December	
2013,	JOIN(2013)	30	final,	p.	11,	http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-
military-staff/save_the_date/docs/joint_communication_on_comprehensive_approach.pdf	
4	See	for	an	overview	the	special	issue:	Hylke	Dijkstra,	“Introduction:	One-and-a-half	cheers	for	the	EU	Global	Strategy”,	In	
Contemporary	Security	Policy,	Vol.	37,	No.	3,	p.	369-373,	https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1244241	
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Second,	the	EU	has	to	define	how	it	relates	to	other	IOs	and	how	it	seeks	to	invest	in	them.	Here,	the	
EU	Global	Strategy	is	relatively	undetermined	at	both	the	programmatic	and	operational	levels.	The	
Strategy	 stresses	 that	 NATO	 remains	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 collective	 defence	 for	 most	 EU	 member	
states	 (the	neutral	non-NATO	members	naturally	excluded).	 It	does,	however,	not	go	much	further	
than	 this	 generic	 statement.	 The	 EU-NATO	 joint	 declarations	 from	 July	 2016	 and	 July	 2018,	which	
were	entirely	developed	and	implemented	separately	from	the	EU	Global	Strategy,	focus	largely	on	
capabilities,	crisis	management	and	issues	such	as	cyber	and	hybrid	threats.5	They	do	not	present	a	
statement	on	actual	collective	defence	and	the	division	of	labour	in	this	area.	
The	 relations	with	 some	 of	 the	 other	 IOs	 remain	 even	 further	 underdeveloped.	 Strikingly,	 despite	
some	ambitious	proposals	in	the	early	2000s	on	EU–UN	cooperation,6	it	does	not	appear	that	the	EU	
Global	Strategy	has	provided	real	additional	momentum	at	the	programmatic	level.	The	visit	of	Sec-
retary-General	 António	 Guterres	 to	 Brussels	 in	May	 2018	was	 notable.	 Yet	 thinking	 about	 EU–UN	
cooperation	no	 longer	 reaches	 the	 level	 it	 aspired	 to	 in	2003–2004,	when	 the	EU	ambitiously	 sug-
gested,	 not	 only	 the	 “bridging	 model”,	 but	 also	 a	 modular	 approach	 as	 well	 as	 over-the-horizon	
standby	 forces.7	The	 EU	 is	 strongly	 supporting	 on	 going	UN	 reform	 efforts	—	 spearheaded	 by	Gu-
terres	—	but	it	is	not	clear	how	this	leads	to	further	EU–UN	cooperation	in	peace	and	security.	
There	 is	 a	 strong	paradox	 in	 the	EU–UN	 relationship.	One	 the	one	hand,	with	nearly	100,000	blue	
helmets	currently	deployed,	the	UN	has	clearly	outgrown	the	EU	in	the	area	of	security.	This	requires	
a	business-like	approach	on	the	side	of	the	UN:	The	UN	can	no	longer	afford	to	wait,	for	instance,	for	
the	EU	 to	put	 together	 a	bridging	operation.	On	 the	other	hand,	precisely	because	of	 these	ambi-
tions,	the	UN	needs	troop	contributors	more	urgently	than	ever	before.	Furthermore,	as	a	result	of	
the	Trump	administration	creating	havoc	across	the	global	governance	landscape,	the	resource	base	
of	UN	peacekeeping	is	being	challenged.8	As	one	of	the	biggest	supporters	of	UN	peacekeeping	–	also	
due	to	the	presence	of	France	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	Security	Council	–	the	EU	has	potential-
ly	a	lot	to	offer	here.	
                                                
5	Joint	Declaration	by	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	the	President	of	the	European	Commission,	and	the	Secretary-
General	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organisation,	8	July	2016,	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24293/signed-copy-
nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en.pdf;	Joint	Declaration	on	EU-NATO	Cooperation	by	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	the	
President	of	the	European	Commission,	and	the	Secretary-General	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organisation,	10	July	2018,	
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf	
6	Claudia	Major,	“EU-UN	cooperation	in	military	crisis	management:	the	experience	of	EUFOR	RD	Congo	in	2006”,	in	Occa-
sional	Paper,	n.	72,	Paris:	EU	Institute	for	Security	Studies,	September	2008,	p.	9-12	
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op-72.pdf	
7	Ibid.	
8	Nikki	Haley,	Remarks	at	a	UN	Security	Council	Open	Debate	on	Peacekeeping,	28	March	2018,	
https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8359	
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This	also	points	toward	the	need	for	renewed	thinking	within	the	EU.	While	the	EU	has	been	promot-
ing	the	language	of	partnership,	effective	multilateralism	and	a	rules-based	global	order,	it	does	not	
sufficiently	 ask	 itself	 what	 other	 IOs	 actually	 expect	 in	 terms	 of	 support.	 The	 UN	would	 probably	
greatly	welcome	the	availability	of	one	of	the	EU	Battlegroups	in	support	of	UN	missions.	At	a	time	
when	the	UN	faces	capabilities	shortfalls,	it	is	disturbing	to	see	that	the	EU	has	deployable	capabili-
ties	but	does	not	actually	use	them.	Also	on	the	UN	side,	there	is	no	time	for	the	politics	and	caveats	
that	come	with	relatively	minor	European	contributions.	You	either	participate	to	UN	missions	or	you	
do	not.9	Similarly,	when	the	EU	deploys	a	parallel	mission,	for	instance	as	is	the	case	in	Mali,	it	does	
not	always	live	up	to	UN	expectations.10	
The	situation	is	not	necessarily	better	with	other	partners.	Quite	surprisingly,	the	OSCE	has	again	be-
come	 an	 important	 partner	 in	 East–West	 relations	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 large-scale	 Special	Monitoring	
Mission	 in	Ukraine.	 This	mission	 is	 critically	 important	 for	 European	 security.	Once	 again,	 the	 EU's	
approach	has	been	less	than	forthcoming.	The	EU	support	has	been	mostly	ad	hoc,	relating	to	extra-
budgetary	project	money	and	the	occasional	armoured	vehicles.11	This	comes	against	the	backdrop	
of	a	chronically	underfunded	OSCE.	One	could	imagine	the	EU	putting	forward	a	stronger	and	more	
permanent	investment.		
With	 the	African	Union	 (AU),	 there	 is	mainly	a	debate	over	 the	compensation	of	 soldiers,	who	are	
largely	paid	through	the	EU's	African	Peace	Facility.	While	UN	Troop	Contributing	Countries	are	com-
pensated	 with	 US$1,332	 per	 soldier	 per	 month,	 the	 EU	 recently	 reduced	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	
troops	of	 the	AU	Mission	 in	Somalia	 from	$1,028	 to	$822	per	soldier	per	month.12	This	has	caused	
friction.	More	worrisome,	there	is	actually	very	little	strategic	discussion	with	the	AU	on	how	the	AU	
mission	fits	in	with	the	EU	comprehensive	approach	for	the	Horn	of	Africa.	
The	EU	Global	Strategy	has	been	very	much	about	defining	the	“EU	interest”:	the	things	that	the	EU	
wants	to	achieve	in	international	relations	and	the	means	that	the	Union	has	at	its	disposal.	As	a	for-
eign	policy	actor,	however,	it	is	important	to	take	a	stronger	interest	in	what	other	international	ac-
tors,	 and	particularly	 other	 IOs,	 actually	want.	 If	 the	 EU	 truly	wants	 to	 strengthen	 the	 rules-based	
                                                
9	Germany,	Sweden	and	the	United	Kingdom,	for	instance,	withdrew	a	handful	of	police	officers	from	the	UN	mission	in	
South	Sudan,	without	informing	the	UN,	when	the	local	security	situation	worsened.	This	resulted	in	a	serious	clash	be-
tween	the	UN	and	these	contributors.	Michelle	Nichols,	“U.N.	memo	on	South	Sudan	leaves	out	criticism	of	Britain”,	in	Reu-
ters,	21	July	2016,	https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southsudan-security-un-idUKKCN1012WM	
10	Hylke	Dijkstra	et	al.,	“Partners	in	conflict	prevention	and	peace	building:	How	the	EU,	UN	and	OSCE	exchange	civilian	ca-
pabilities	in	Kosovo,	Mali	and	Armenia”,	in	EU-CIVCAP,	DL	4.2,	4	September	2017,	
https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/eu-civcap_deliverable_4-2.pdf	
11	OSCE,	EU	donates	vehicles	to	OSCE	Special	Monitoring	Mission	to	Ukraine,	3	February	2016,	
https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220086	
12	Paul	Williams,	Paying	for	AMISOM:	Are	Politics	and	Bureaucracy	Undermining	the	AU’s	Largest	Peace	Operation?,	11	Jan-
uary	2017,	https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/	
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global	order	and	put	forward	an	integrated	approach,	it	should	also	facilitate,	invest	in	and	help	out	
other	 IOs.	This	 should	be	 less	on	a	quid	pro	quo,	or	 transactional,	basis.	 The	EU	can	also	do	much	
good	by	being	a	donor,	an	investor	and	by	leading	from	behind	–	remembering	that	is	not	necessary	
for	 the	EU's	 integrated	approach	 that	 it	be	multi-dimensional,	multi-phase	and	multi-level	 in	every	
respect.		
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